OVOR: A Foray into Creating Statistics

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Anyone reading this blog even half-heartedly knows how much stock I put into the player tracking statistics so wonderfully provided by NBA.com. Most of the base information used in the Player Breakdown series comes from a player's percentile placement compared to the rest of the league, along with the frequency of said play type, and from those baselines I extrapolate on what those numbers tell us. A trained basketball mind will tell you that every advanced stat out there has its flaws, and at the end of the day, observations on a player are much almost always more valuable than numbers like PER and RPM, which boil down a player's box scores into a value compared to the rest of the league. Unlike baseball, the other half of this blog, there are many different variables that play a role in how a possession ends, and numbers don't tell the whole story. Keeping the idea of qualitative observation in mind, the NBA signed an agreement with a company called Synergy Sports Technology way back in 2008, providing some of the services Synergy Sports offer to NBA.com, like play type statistics. It's not very clear on that page (and I don't feel like researching how they do this), but basically Synergy Sports tracks every attempt in a game, assigns it a play type, and tells us who attempted the shot, who defended the shot, and whether it was converted or not. These basic numbers along with a few others are crunched and spit out onto NBA.com, telling us how frequently a player attempts a certain play, how often they defend a certain play, how many points they scored from that area, and more. Instead of just knowing that LeBron James shot 49% from the field this season, we can look and see that he shoots 40% in isolation situations, 68% in transition, 44% when spotting up, etc. Essentially, these numbers provide a more qualitative view on basketball, something that we haven't really seen from statistics we now accept as commonplace. Even with the availability of these numbers, they have yet to be incorporated into new statistics on a large scale, so I figured I should tinker with the numbers a bit and see what happens.

The basic idea for what is about to follow is that we look at the average percentile (based on points per possession) a player placed in in the 11 offensive play types and 7 defensive play types provided by NBA.com and Synergy Sports and combine them to see what we get. The start of this project was pretty much me thinking, "What would happen if I averaged the offensive and defensive percentiles for a player?" Of course, being as ambitious as I am, the absolute first goal of this project was to create a new value-placing stat to replace PER. As quickly as I started, that dream died. Now, I'm not entirely sure what to make of this stat (I don't have a degree in Statistics), but I think it has potential. In the first phase of this project, I averaged the percentiles of 3 radically different players: DeAndre Jordan, LeBron James, and Stephen Curry.

"Neat! What does it mean?" you are(n't) probably thinking! Well, APO stands for Average Percentile - Offense, APD stands for Average Percentile - Defense, and CAP stands for Combined Average Percentile. APO and APD were calculated by adding up all of the percentiles provided by NBA.com and dividing by how much types a player qualified for. For example, Steph Curry did not qualify for defense against the roll man, so his placement is not included. Qualification is simply playing 10 mins/game and garnering 10 possessions of that play type. CAP is APO + APD / 2. Complex, right? Since I'm not an elite coder and gathering those 3 player's info was tiring enough, I didn't really look at anyone else's numbers, but already a story is unfolding. Play type statistics will probably end up favoring players who "stay in their lane" on both ends, so to speak. Stephen Curry placed incredibly high on offense and was the best on defense out of the three according to these numbers, and that can be attributed to a multitude of reasons. A player like LeBron, for example. qualified for every category, and he did not score incredibly well in most of them, placing highest in things like transition and isolation play types. The fact that he qualified for more play types hurt his overall number, even though it was fairly close to Stephen Curry in the end. Another example would be DeAndre Jordan, a premier defender, receiving a 38.58 APD. This low score comes mainly from the fact that DeAndre qualified for placement in areas like isolation defense and defense off of screens, areas most big men generally don't do well in. Almost immediately after the numbers came out, I figured that perhaps looking at play type numbers aren't the best for measuring individual defense, and thus the search for good defensive metrics continue. Even so, the offensive numbers seemed pretty good to me, but I wanted to expand on them a little. NBA.com also provides frequency data, telling us how often a player executes a certain play type. I wanted to incorporate these numbers into the basic equation somehow, as I thought it might be more fair. I also didn't look at DeAndre's offensive numbers for this section, primarily because I found LeBron and Curry's numbers more interesting.

Now we see a new category: AAPO. This stands for Adjusted Average Percentile - Offense, as it looks to improve on the raw APO number. AAPD could definitely exist, but I wouldn't put too much stock into it considering the flaws in defensive play type statistics. The "Adjusted" part of the name comes from the fact that this equation accounts for frequency of a play type. For example, Stephen Curry placed in the 73rd percentile for transition offense, and it made up about 22% of his offense. The percentile number is multiplied by the frequency percentage to create a number more indicative of a player's rating in that area. Curry's raw transition percentile came out to 15.93. This same principle was applied to every play type the two players qualified for, and the product of said frequency/percentile adjustment was then averaged again by the number of categories the player qualified for. The number is based on how frequently the two attempted a certain play type and how many points per possession they score compared to the rest of the league, and a rudimentary score is created on the other side. Stephen received a score of 9.5, whereas LeBron received a 6.58. Draw your own conclusions from these numbers, as the scale is not out of 10 like one would think. If this equation was applied to a larger sample size, a more accurate conclusion could be drawn, but it took long enough to do just James and Curry by hand. I was pretty pleased with my work by this point, so of course I decided to see how much further I could go with these numbers. 

Finally we see OVOR, the namesake of this article! What the hell is it? To be honest, I don't really know. Again, I don't have a degree in this kind of stuff, so I pretty much took the VORP equation (which is [BPM - (-2.0)] * (minutes played/3936) * (games played/82) for the uninitiated) and substituted BPM for AAPO. The VORP equation adjusts for how many minutes a player plays and how many games the player plays in compared to the total amount of minutes in a season and the total amount of games. The -2.0 was changed to -1.7, as according to basketball-reference, -1.7 accounts for offensive replacement level value and -0.3 accounts for defense. Applying these ideas on a wider scale would provide a more accurate measurement, but at the very least, even if these calculations are extremely basic, I think that looking past simple box score stats and exploring everything the new stats the NBA provides us is something worth looking into, preferably by someone more educated than I. Perhaps this wasn't the most successful venture, but hopefully it at least stimulated some thought.

Credit: NBA.com, basketball-reference.com

Giannis Antetokounmpo: Breakdown

Garrett W. Ellwood/NBAE via Getty Images

The Greek Freak! Mr. Alphabet Soup! The Greek prospect has captivated not only Milwaukee fans, but the entire league thanks not only to his incredibly long and difficult name, but his personality and playing ability. Giannis was drafted 15th in 2013, but he wasn't known for being much more than a project pick for the middling Bucks. Some analysts questioned the pick, and most viewers had not even heard of the Nigerian immigrant. He quickly gained recognition for his huge hands, his 7'3 wingspan, and later, the fact that he was rumored to still be growing despite already being 6'9. At this point, Giannis is closer to 6'11 and is pushing 7'0. He came in weighing only 196 pounds, but bulking efforts over the last offseason had Giannis at 217 pounds and he has likely added even more this offseason. Giannis came into the league very raw on both sides of the both, with most people looking at him for his potential rather than his actual worth. Even with that rawness in mind, Giannis quickly put up amazing highlight plays, littered with chasedown blocks, great finishes, and one-man fastbreaks. Antetokounmpo's huge strides allow him to gather from outside the paint and practically gallop towards the rim, as seen during his rookie season.

Even though Giannis shows flashes of elite offensive and defensive capabilities, his youth definitely showed. He averaged about 25 minutes his rookie season, posting 7 points, 4.5 rebounds, 2 assists, a steal, and a block on 42% shooting overall and 35% from 3, adding up to a 46% eFG. His rookie season was good enough to put him on the All-NBA Rookie Second Team. The Bucks failed to make the playoffs, posting the worst record in the league and receiving the #2 pick for their efforts (or lack thereof), which they used to add Jabari Parker. They also added Jason Kidd despite not actually firing Larry Drew beforehand, and franchise cornerstone Larry Sanders got involved in a barfight, sidelining him for the early parts of the season. In essence, The 2014/15 season was not looking good for the Bucks, before it even started. Before the season started, Kidd experimented with Giannis at the point guard spot, which proved worthwhile in the transition but in the halfcourt, not so much. Even then, the possibility is always there. Giannis would be a matchup nightmare for opposing point guards (perhaps pushing the big guard trend to the extreme), and his passing isn't too bad. Anyways, I digress. Coach Kidd had a specific vision for the development of Giannis this past season, telling the prospect to limit his three point shooting and focus on getting to the rim, and the difference is clearly there when comparing the two shot charts.

While he took much fewer threes, his production at the rim and in the midrange region improved greatly. Concerns over Milwaukee's spacing has arisen ever since Michael Carter-Williams joined the team, but I don't have any doubts regarding Giannis' shooting ability from 3. His finishing ability is already great for a 20 year old, and the added bulk he's put on this offseason should make it easier for him to finish at the rim. This past season, Giannis improved greatly on his statistical output, posting averages of 13 points, 7 rebounds, 2.5 assists, a steal, and a block on 49% shooting and 50% eFG. His 3 point percentage dropped to 16%, but he shot less than one a game, meaning that 94% of his attempts came from 2 point range, up from 72% the season prior. His free throw percentage also increased 6%, from 68% to 74%. Behind Michael Carter-Williams, Antetokounmpo averaged 35 passes per game, creating about 6 points for his team every game based on his passing alone, taking into account secondary assists (or "hockey assists") as well. Giannis did not actually pull up for jumpers too often, only attempting 2 per game and converting on them 33% of the time, and he attempted even fewer jumpers after running off screens. In addition, only about 2% of Giannis' possession ended as a result of a hand-off play. So how did Giannis score? It seems like Coach Kidd stuck to his word, focusing his play calling mainly on getting Giannis to the rim rather than him shooting jumpers. A large chunk of Giannis' possessions ended with a drive to the rim, leading his team in total drives at a rate of 5.6 per game. About 4 of his 13 points per game came from drives, shooting 47% on those attempts.

Giannis sizes up Iguodala, creating enough space to drive towards the left side of the rim, where he is able to finish over the onlooking Warriors defense. When Kidd called a cut play for Giannis, he thrived, scoring on said plays 67% of the time and shooting 63%, put him in the 65th percentile league wide. A HUGE part of the Greek Freak's offensive game came from the fastbreak, where his teammates often looked to give him the ball and let him go to work. His long strides allow him to get down the court in only a few dribbles. He then utilizes his finishing ability and long arms to score about 60% of the time, creating 1.15 points per fastbreak opportunity and shooting 65% overall, putting him well into the top half of the league.

One dribble from halfcourt to the rim! What the fuck!

That play needs little explanation. Look at that wingspan! Most of the jumpshots Antetokounmpo took came from spot up situations, accounting for 16% of all of his possessions. He shot 44% on spot up attempts, garnering a 46% eFG and scoring about 45% of the time, good for placement in the 48th percentile. The rest of Antetokounmpo's offense came from isolation plays, a place Giannis was thrust into 207 times this past season. He only scored 0.75 pointers per isolation possession, shooting 37% and putting him in the 40th percentile, despite making up 19% of his offense. About half as often as he isolated, Giannis posted up, posting similar numbers of 0.8 points per possession, however he shot 48% on all post up attempts.

One of the things Antetokounmpo fans really hype up is his defensive skill and his potential in that area. Most players that come into this league with quickness and a long wingspan are hailed in similar fashion, but Giannis perhaps moreso due to the fact that he's one of the most hyped players in the league. Giannis performed well in defensive isolation situations, only allowing 39% on attempts against him. He isn't the best isolation defender on the team, especially when compared to Khris Middleton or Michael Carter-Williams, but he can hold his own, often matched up against the other team's second best wing player.

In this clip, Giannis effectively utilizes his length to shut down the left side of the court against Jimmy, shading him to the right and away from the 3 point line. He aptly stays with his man and forces Butler to put up a well-contested stepback at the buzzer.

Here, Antetokounmpo in essence guides Lin towards the big man down in the low post. Lin sees that the big man is in position to help should he continue the drive, so he instead pulls up for an ill-advised fader that Giannis contests well. Giannis is about league average when defending against spot up shooters, allowing 1 point per spot up possession and placing right around the 50th percentile. Giannis really shone when defending the pick-and-roll ball handler, as opposed to guarding the roll man. He isn't quite strong enough to deter a big man set on rolling to the rim, but his length and height advantage allows him to quickly close out on the ball handler and trick him into shooting a bad shot, even if he is a step behind the handler, allowing only 34% shooting and giving up points only 32% of the time.

Guarding against his eventual teammate here, Giannis fights over the screen and keeps Carter-Williams in check. A combination of a threatening rotation by Zaza and the a looming Giannis behind him, Michael settles for a one-footed jumper, which Giannis is in range to contest. The brand of defense Antetokounmpo plays is a frenetic one, filled with energy and youthfulness. Keeping that in mind, Giannis often found himself without a man to guard on second and third chance opportunities, scrambling to find his matchup. Not seen in the play above is this sequence,

where Giannis chases after the wrong man after the rebound, or this crazy one,

where Giannis and the Bucks in general are all over the place. Some of that may be attributed to lack of communication on defense, but look for Giannis to really work on his defensive awareness this offseason. The tools, mentality, and attitude are all there, and Antetokounmpo has made it known recently that he plans on spending his whole career in Milwaukee. Even so, you have to hope that you see more of this,

and less of this,

this coming season.

Credit: nbasavant, basketball reference, nba.com, Getty Images

Team Evaluations A-Z: Baltimore Orioles

AP Photo/Kathy Willens

July, 24
46-48 3rd in AL East (7GB)
Runs 410 (7th in AL) Runs Allowed 374 (6th in AL) Differential 36 (6th in AL)
3.80 Team ERA (6th in AL)


The defending AL East Champs are not in the position they hoped to be towards the end of July. While many thought the Orioles would take a big step back; arguing the loss of Nelson Cruz and his 40 HR would be to large of a deficit to overcome. I still believed this was a team deserving play-off expectations, because I thought the return of third basemen Manny Machado and Catcher Matt Weiters would suffice as a replacement for Cruz's overall production. So far Machado has performed extremely well, but after being swept by the first place Yankees, the baseball world is wondering if the Orioles will become sellers as we approach the trade deadline.


Fortunately for the Orioles offense, Manny Machado has been a superstar this season. While having always been a terrific defender, Machado has improved immensely on the offensive end. Thus far the third basemen has a .307 TAv, .533 SLG, and 10.2 FRAA. He's become by far the best player on this Orioles team and will probably be a 6.5 win player in fWAR, rWAR, and WARP. On the opposite end of the spectrum, both shortstop JJ Hardy and Matt Wieters have been disappointing. Hardy has hit for a terrible .226 TAv and Wieters hasn't hit much better with a .239 TAv, also both are currently below a .300 OBP. Center fielder Adam Jones has improved marginally from last year in both OBP and SLG %. Overall as a team the Orioles offense is about average with a 101 wRC+ and .318 wOBA.


The pitching staff is supported by a defense with a .699 defensive efficiency that ranks 4th in the AL, which is impressive considering even prior to park adjustments the Orioles defense is able to post excellent efficiency  while playing in a hitter friendly ball park. Nevertheless the first line of defense is the pitching and the starting rotation together has a 4.55 FIP and a 90 ERA+. Wei-Yin Chen and Ubaldo Jimenez have been decent, but last year's best starter Chris Tillman has been dreadful with a 4.13 FIP and a 78 ERA+. Backing up the rotation the Baltimore bullpen is led by lefty Zach Britton who has a 1.80 FIP and also Darren O'Day who has a 1.04 ERA and 2.84 FIP. Overall the Orioles bullpen is stacked with the only weak link being Tommy Hunter who has a OK 3.86 ERA, but nonetheless the bullpen is the strong point of the Baltimore pitching staff.


The two strengths for Baltimore is their defense and bullpen. A decent but inconsistent offense along with a bad starting rotation lacking a 1 or even a 2 is why they're 2 games under .500. I expect the Orioles to not be in the postseason  and to remain patient at the deadline by not making any desperate moves or to start a rebuilding project. They definitely need to acquire arms in the starting rotation as well as some bats to help Machado. Hopefully Jimmy Parades who has shown an ability to put to ball in play, but needs to walk more and hit for more power.

TS% or eFG%?

Kevin C. Cox, Andrew D. Bernstein/NBAE via Getty Images

While basketball can be described best as a qualitative game rather than a quantitative one when it come to statistics, advanced statistics and analytics certainly have a place when assessing a player. Pioneers like John Hollinger and Daryl Morey have brought statistics past the basic box score stats to light. Things we commonly use today like player efficiency rating, value over replacement player, and win shares have all stemmed from the analytics movement that has taken the NBA by storm. When looking at shooting efficiency specifically, a trained basketball mind will typically look past the normal field goal percentage and three point percentage and towards stats like true shooting percentage and effective field goal percentage. Looking at the leaders for both true shooting percentage and effective field goal percentage this past season brings up two extremely different players: Kyle Korver at 70% true shooting and DeAndre Jordan at an effective field goal percentage of 71%. Obviously, the two stats weigh the percentages available on different levels, so we're going to take a deeper look into what makes up these equations and what kind of players the equations lean towards.

True shooting percentage, abbreviated as TS%, is a stat developed by APBRmetrics to measure how efficiently a player shoots the ball. The equation itself isn't actually too complex. It looks like this:


PTS stands for points, FGA stands for field goals attempted, and FTA stands for free throws attempted. The 2 essentially makes the end product look like a percentage, as otherwise the number looks more like points per field goals attempted. The 0.44 is more subjective than anything, as that is what APBRmetrics valued a free throw attempt compared to a normal field goal attempt.

On the other side of things, there is effective field goal percentage, often abbreviated as eFG%. eFG% looks at field goal makes instead of points per attempt, and the equation looks as follows:


In this case, FG stands for field goals made, and 3P stands for 3 point field goal made. The 0.5 in the equation accounts for the fact that 3 pointers are worth 50% more than 2 pointers, and thus must be weighted fairly. Where TS% and eFG% differ is in what they take into account when calculating their values. eFG% looks at both field goals made and attempted as well as putting 3 pointers into their own category, whereas TS% looks at points scored and attempts, seperating free throws attempted from the rest. So why does Kyle Korver lead the league in TS% if eFG% seems to favor shooters more? Why does DeAndre Jordan lead the league in eFG% if he doesn't shoot threes? Well, we know that about 75% of Korver's attempts this year were 3 pointers, which he converted at an extraordinary 50% clip. Keeping in mind that TS% is essentially points per attempt/2, the sheer volume in which Korver hits threes combined with the fact that Korver converted them extremely well puts Korver at the top. Looking past Korver on the league leaders, we see this:

Looking at the list, we see two kinds of players: efficient 3 point shooters (Korver, Curry, Morrow) and at-the-rim style big men (Chandler, Jordan, Gobert). The gap between Korver and Chandler is a miniscule 0.02%, telling us that Korver and Chandler scored approximately 1.4 points per attempt. We also see DeAndre Jordan close by, our league leader in eFG%. When we look at the top 20 in eFG%, we see similar results:

Compared to the other list, the gap between 1 and 2 is much larger, about 1.2%. The players we see on this list are much different than the TS% list. While some players like Jordan, Valanciunas and Curry make a second appearance, the kinds of players we see on the eFG% list is much more varied, with multi-faceted players like LeBron and Paul making the list. From this list we can see that while eFG% favors elite 3 point shooters, players who score from all around the floor make the cut due to their high field goal percentages elsewhere (i.e. LeBron in the paint, Paul from mid-range).

Even though TS% and eFG% serve to replace basic stats like FG%, the two tell us much different stories. If you are looking for a stat that tells you how efficiently a player scores based purely on how many attempts they take, you should mainly look at TS%. On the other hand, if you want a stat that is more fair than straight-up FG%, you should be using eFG%. Just a heads up: This past season, DeAndre Jordan placed 4th all time in eFG% amongst players playing more than 50 games. Who's in front of him? NBA legends Chris Wilcox, Wilt Chamberlain, and Ryan Hollins, of course.

Credits: Getty Images, basketball-reference.com, en.wikipedia.org

Team Evaluations A-Z: Atlanta Braves

Mike Zarrilli/Getty Images

July, 17
42-47 3rd in NL East (7GB)
Runs 347 (10th in NL) Runs Allowed 385 (10th in NL) Differential -38 (10th in NL)
4.03 Team ERA (10th in NL)





The Atlanta Braves were a formidable team just two seasons ago, when they won 96 games as well as the NL East. Fast forward to the beginning of the 2015 season where the Braves were expected to under go a full rebuilding process, and win 71 games finishing fourth ahead of only the Phillies in the NL East. So far they have performed better than expected, although they're in the midst of a 5 game losing streak.


The offense is led by slugger first basemen Freddie Freeman, who's BB % has decreased from 12.7% in 2014 to 9.2% now. However, Freeman has countered his decline in walks by hitting for more power. His SLG % has increased from .461 last year to .520 now. This notable increase in power has increased his wRC+ from 140 to 145. In addition to Freeman, another standout on offense has been Nick Markakis who's performed with a .381 OBP. Another outfielder who has performed well offensively has been Cameron Maybin who has had the best offensive year of his career with 117 wRC+. A player having the worst offensive year of his career is third basemen Chris Johnson. He has been disappointing so far through 44 games played for him, because in 2014 he had 127 wRC+, this year he has failed to surpass a .300 OBP. Overall this is an offense that ranks 13th in OBP, but ranks 26th in SLG % and 30th in both isolated power and HR %. The Braves simply need more extra base hits to add more thump to an offense that isn't scaring any opposing pitcher.


The starting rotation is led by Shelby Miller who is having the best year of his career, mainly due to his progress in home run prevention. The Braves have to be thrilled with the amount of production coming from a 24 year old. On the other hand Julio Teheran has been a disappointment. After improving last year over his rookie campaign, Teheran has regressed with an over 4.5 ERA and FIP. Alex Wood has been solid and is on pace to get near a 4 fWAR. The bullpen took a hit this past offseason losing closer Craig Kimbrel who has probably been the best reliever in baseball the past four years. The trade made sense for the rebuilding process  to acquire minor league talent and Cameron Maybin who has performed well, but it definitely weakens the bullpen. This shows in the ERA where the Atlanta bullpen ranks 29th with a 4.40. Overall the Atlanta defense behind the pitcher ranks 26th according to Baseball Prospectus in Defensive Efficiency, which obviously is going to be a detriment to overall defense.


The Atlanta Braves overall are a team I believe even with a 42-47 record are over performing. Their recent performance of 5 straight losses I believe is a better sign of what's to come in the second half than their first half record. In terms of the rebuilding process they need help everywhere. I think the first move should be to lock up Shelby miller to a big 6+ year deal to stay in Atlanta, then the next goal is to develop or sign players who can add thump to an offense that doesn't hit for power other than Freeman besides maybe Juan Uribe. The bullpen and defense both need work as well, therefore I expect the Braves to have around 75 wins this year and will take at least three more years of smart decisions to be able to contend again.







Credits: Fangraphs, Baseball Prospectus, ESPN

Team Evaluations A-Z: Arizona Diamondbacks

Tom Pennington/Getty Images

July, 17
42-45 3rd in NL West (7.5GB)
Runs 392 (1st in NL), Runs Allowed 392, (11th in NL) Differential 0 (7th in NL)
4.23 Team ERA (13th in NL)



This season so far for the Arizona Diamondbacks has been surprisingly competitive. Prior to the beginning of the 2015 season, many analysts predicted the Diamondbacks to win around 70 games and finish last in the NL West. With 42 wins at the All Star break and the San Diego Padres being a major disappointment with a 41-49 record, it's safe to assume the Diamondbacks will exceed those expectations.


 They have been led by superstar Paul Goldschmidt who's been an offensive juggernaut with a .443 wOBA and 183 wRC+.The biggest wildcard going into the season was 24 year old Cuban rookie Yasmany Tomas, who signed a 6 year $68.5m contract this past offseason. So far he's held his own offensively putting up a .348 wOBA and 118 wRC+, but defensively, as expected he hasn't done very well with a -4 UZR. Another improvement from last year has been AJ Pollock who has been a very good and overlooked all around outfielder. Boasting a .353 wOBA and 122 wRC+ with 9 DRS and a 3.4 fWAR, which exceeds his 3.3 fWAR last season, and we're only roughly halfway through the season. In addition, on June 3rd the Diamondbacks dealt 1B/OF Mark Trumbo to the Seattle Mariners for Catcher Wellington Castillo and young pitching talent, which should hopefully support a bad pitching staff. I thought this was a good trade, because Trumbo is a pretty good hitter but is slow and a defensive liability, plus with the addition of Tomas the Diamondbacks are well equipped at the corner outfield and first base positions.


Unfortunately the Diamondbacks offense has not been supported by a good starting rotation. Ruby De La Rosa and Jeremy Helickson are both struggling with a 5 ERA each and over 5 FIP. In addition, young talented pitcher Archie Bradley quickly faced growing pains before being sent to the DL. The bullpen has been better ranked 14th in terms of ERA. Closer Brad Ziegler leads the way with a 1.14 ERA and 3.44 FIP but a .178 BABIP seems unsustainable. Randall Delgado has also pitched decently with a 3.21 ERA but a 3.69 BB/9 is alarming. Oliver Perez has also been OK but like the starting rotation no one in the bullpen is a dominant force who one can trust to get things done. To conclude, the Diamondbacks starting rotation is terrible lacking anything close to a true number 1. Paired with a decent bullpen it's an overall bad pitching staff.


 Due to the lack of pitching I doubt the Diamondbacks will contend for an NL wildcard, but the foundation of cornerstone players are there if they are able to re-sign A.J Pollock, and if Yasmany Tomas continues to grow to help Paul Goldschmidt. I predict the Diamondbacks will finish with 80-82 wins and finish 3rd in the NL West. If the Diamondbacks are able to re-sign Pollock and acquire quality starting pitching I expect to them to be in October for the 2016 season.







Credits: Fangraphs, ESPN

Madison Bumgarner Is Overrated

AP Photo/Jeff Chiu

Madison Bumgarner had a historic October in 2014. Besides one bad start in 2012,
Bumgarner has been fantastic in the postseason, with a 2.18 ERA and a 3.05 FIP on 88 IP. However, the past 3 seasons Bumgarner has not been a top 15 pitcher in Baseball. In fact, for the sake of using one stat, the past 3 years in fWAR Bumgarner has ranked on average 22. In case you didn't know fWAR is comprised primarily of a pitchers FIP and IP, along of course with park and league adjustments. So how is he doing this year? Well through half of the 2015 season Bumgarner has regressed, because of his increase  in home runs conceded, which is linked to the decrease in his GB % from 44.4% in 2014 to 40% now. Currently, he ranks 31st in fWAR and has a .5 rWAR, so he hasn't performed like an ace even if you look at basic run prevention instead of defensive independent stats. Even the past 3 years, Bumgarner's average rWAR is 0.56. I understand weighting post season performance over regular season performance, but a team still has to make the post season to have a chance, and before last season Bumgarner was a good not great postseason pitcher just like he is in the regular season. I believe last postseason was an anomaly, and unless his overall numbers improve I doubt we will see another stretch like last October from him in the postseason.


Credits: Fangraphs, Baseball-Reference, Bleacher Report